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Abstract Moderate pluralism is a popular position in contemporary philosophy of biology. 4 
Despite its popularity, various authors have argued that it tends to slide off into a radical form 5 
of pluralism that is both normatively and descriptively unacceptable. This paper looks at the 6 
case of biological species classification, and evaluates a popular way of avoiding radical 7 
pluralism by relying on the shared aims and norms of a discipline. The main contention is that 8 
while these aims and norms may play an important role in the legitimacy of species 9 
classifications, they fail to fend off radical pluralism. It follows from this that the legitimacy of 10 
species classifications is also determined by local decisions about the aims of research and how 11 
to operationalize and balance these. This is important, I argue, because it means that any 12 
acceptable view on the legitimacy of classification should be able to account for these local 13 
decisions. 14 
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1. Pluralism and the legitimacy of classification 19 
Pluralism, which I will take to be the claim that there are multiple legitimate classifications of 20 
a particular domain, is a popular position in contemporary philosophy of biology. It has been 21 
defended for individuals (Wilson, 1999), genes (Waters, 2006), race (Pigliucci & Kaplan, 2003), 22 
and populations (Gannett, 2003) among many other things. Its appeal lies mostly in its fit with 23 
scientific practice; it simply happens to be the case that in many biological subdisciplines, 24 
scientists productively use multiple, cross-cutting classifications of the same things for 25 
different purposes. Adopting a pluralist position about those things helps to explain how these 26 
different classifications can all be legitimate. Pluralism also has practical benefits for scientists 27 
themselves. Developing multiple classifications rather than putting all money on one horse 28 
can be beneficial for satisfying different aims, dividing scientific labour into manageable 29 
chunks, or having alternatives in case one classification turns out to be unproductive (Chang, 30 
2012).   31 
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Despite its appeal, some have argued against pluralism on the basis of what Ereshefsky (1992, 32 
p. 681-684) calls the ‘no criterion objection’. As Hull (1987, p. 178) puts it, ‘the greatest danger 33 
of pluralism is that it provides no means or even motivation for reducing conceptual 34 
luxuriance’. Developing this objection in the context of species classification, Ghiselin (1987, 35 
p. 136; cited in Slater, 2017, p. 8) writes that  36 
one can pick and chose [sic] among a variety of criteria, such as reproductive isolation, 37 
and similarities and differences in this, that, and the other. But we are not told how to 38 
make the criterion of membership be an objective one.  39 
The idea is that if we can consider multiple classifications legitimate, based on various patterns 40 
we observe, there seems to be no reason why we should not consider any pattern a legitimate 41 
basis for classification. Thus, the fear is that pluralism, appealing as it may be, slides off into a 42 
radical form of pluralism that considers innumerable different classifications equally 43 
legitimate.  44 
This no-criterion objection deserves to be taken seriously, as any philosophical view on the 45 
legitimacy of classification that leads to radical pluralism fails to meet two crucial desiderata 46 
of such views: descriptive accuracy and normative potency. The first of these implies that any 47 
acceptable view on the legitimacy of classification should be able to account for successful 48 
classificatory practices (Boyd, 2000; Khalidi 2013; Slater, 2014). If we look at such practices, it 49 
is clear that radical pluralism of the kind described above is rare. Biologists typically do not 50 
consider any observed pattern an equally legitimate basis for classification, and commonly 51 
provide reasons for favouring one pattern over another. A descriptively accurate view on the 52 
legitimacy of classification must be able to account for these reasons and biologists’ selective 53 
representation of patterns. A view on the legitimacy of classification that leads to radical 54 
pluralism fails to do this and thus is, as Hacking (2007, p. 229) writes, at risk of being merely 55 
‘scholastic’ talk, or part of an ‘inbred set of degenerating problems that have increasingly little 56 
do with the issues that arise in a larger context’.  57 
Secondly, such a view would also fail to meet the desideratum of normative potency, which 58 
holds that any acceptable philosophical view on the legitimacy of scientific classification 59 
should provide guidance on how to regiment classifications and arbitrate classificatory 60 
disputes (Craver, 2009). This desideratum poses a problem for radically pluralist views, as they 61 
consider any classification that tracks some pattern in the world equally legitimate. Clearly, 62 
such a view will be of little use to decide which of several competing classificatory schemes 63 
should be adopted, funded, or taught. 64 
For these reasons, pluralist-minded philosophers have attempted to resist the slide to radical 65 
pluralism by relying on what I will call ‘classificatory norms’. These are the generally accepted 66 
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aims and norms of a scientific discipline that determine the legitimacy of classification in that 67 
domain and, in doing so, reduce radical pluralism to a more moderate variant. The main aim 68 
of this paper is to present and evaluate this popular way of avoiding radical pluralism and 69 
accounting for the legitimacy of scientific classification. Like much of the earlier philosophical 70 
work on classification, I will do this focusing on the case of species. The main contention of 71 
the paper is that while generally accepted classificatory norms may play an important role in 72 
the legitimacy of species classifications, they ultimately fail to fend off radical pluralism. I show 73 
that in addition to these norms, taxonomists rely on local decisions about the aims of their 74 
research and how to operationalize and balance these. This is important, I argue, because it 75 
means that any good philosophical view on the legitimacy of scientific classification should be 76 
able to account for such local decisions. 77 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The second section specifies what is meant by radical 78 
and moderate pluralism, and develops the no-criterion objection in the context of species. The 79 
third section discusses how currently popular views on the legitimacy of scientific classification 80 
address this worry by appealing to classificatory norms, and the fourth section then argues 81 
that this solution is unsuccessful. The fifth section discusses the implications of this failure for 82 
philosophical accounts of the legitimacy of classification. The final section summarizes and 83 
concludes the paper. 84 
2. World-based classification and radical pluralism  85 
The previous section pointed out why radical pluralism poses a threat to philosophical views 86 
on the legitimacy of classification. This discussion provides a useful starting point to 87 
characterize the difference between moderate and radical pluralism. This is important, as one 88 
might worry that this difference is somewhat arbitrary, and consequently not philosophically 89 
interesting. The discussion above suggests that pluralism is only attractive if we retain the 90 
ability to make sense of scientific practice (descriptively accurate) and regiment scientific 91 
classifications (normatively potent). This implies that there is an important difference 92 
between radical and moderate pluralism: the former is any pluralism that is subject to these 93 
problems because it accepts too many classifications, and the latter is any view that accepts 94 
multiple classifications without succumbing to these problems. Thus, even if there is no clear 95 
boundary between the two, and the difference is merely quantitative, there is still a 96 
meaningful distinction.  97 
With this distinction in hand, we can investigate more closely why moderate species pluralism 98 
risks sliding off into radical pluralism. Pluralism is not simply the claim that a domain can be 99 
classified in multiple ways; this would be a trivial position, as it is easy to come up with 100 
infinitely many gerrymandered classifications for any domain. Rather, pluralism about a 101 
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particular domain implies that there are multiple legitimate classifications of that domain. The 102 
radical pluralism that proponents of the no criterion objection worry about is the position that 103 
there are very many classifications that are equally legitimate. To understand and evaluate 104 
this objection, then, we must clarify what precisely determines the legitimacy of scientific 105 
classification. 106 
Hull and Ghiselin, as is apparent from the latter’s citation above, assume that the legitimacy 107 
of species classifications is somehow determined by what the world is like. Interpreted in this 108 
sense, the no criterion objection holds that once we accept that several classifications might 109 
be legitimate, we lack the means of holding a ‘reasonable middle ground’ (Hull, 1987, p. 178) 110 
between monism and a radical pluralism that recognises any feature of the world as a 111 
legitimate basis for classification. Of course, this argument needs further spelling out. While it 112 
is generally assumed, both in the literature on species and in the literature on classification 113 
more generally, that the legitimacy of classifications depends on what the world is like, there 114 
is no one who defends that simply any feature of the world can equally legitimately serve as 115 
the basis for classification. Instead, philosophers of classification typically argue that only 116 
particular kinds of features in the world should guide classification. There are, broadly 117 
speaking, three competing views on this: essentialism, causal views, and simple similarity 118 
views. To evaluate the no criterion objection, it is worth considering whether it still holds on 119 
these popular and more restrictive views on the relation between the world and classification. 120 
The first and most restrictive of these views is essentialism. According to the essentialist, 121 
legitimate classifications are those that track essences or essential properties (Ellis, 2001; 122 
Putnam, 1975). Such essences form the necessary and sufficient conditions for a particular to 123 
be member of a legitimate category, and often also explain the other, non-essential properties 124 
of those particulars. To use a time-worn example, ‘gold’ is considered a legitimate category 125 
because all its instances share an essence, namely a particular atomic structure, which at the 126 
same time explains some of gold’s other properties, such as its melting point and colour. As 127 
essentialism prioritizes a small part of the similarity relations (namely, those that involve 128 
essential properties) as the basis for classification, it would avoid radical pluralism. However, 129 
it is now well-known that the groups that biologists recognise as species do not share any 130 
unique set of phenotypic or genotypic traits, and essentialism concerning species is widely 131 
rejected (e.g. Sober, 1980). While essentialism may thus fend off radical pluralism in parts of 132 
the world with essentialist categories, is fails to do so for species classification. 133 
A second view on how the world determines the legitimacy of scientific classification is what 134 
one might call a simple similarity view (Häggqvist, 2005; Slater, 2014). According to this view, 135 
a category is legitimate if it tracks the stable clustering of properties in the world. The idea is 136 
that while there are very many similarity-relations, some of these tend to cluster together and 137 
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form clusters that are stable in a wide range of contexts. For example, the groups of organisms 138 
that biologists recognise as species have a wide range of morphological, behavioural, genetic 139 
and developmental properties in common, and tend to remain similar in many of these 140 
respects throughout their life. Particulars in a category like ‘all organisms in Cambridge’, on 141 
the other hand, most likely share only one noteworthy property; moreover, this category is 142 
not very stable, as organisms move in and out of Cambridge continuously. The simple 143 
similarity view rejects such unstable categories characterized by few properties, and only 144 
considers categories legitimate if the particulars share enough properties in a sufficiently 145 
stable fashion. In other words, this view adopts a criterion of sufficient similarity for the 146 
legitimacy of classification. 147 
Unlike essentialism, the simple similarity view seems to fit well with the groups that 148 
taxonomists recognise as species, because these are usually made up of organisms that are 149 
similar in many respects and in a relatively stable fashion. It is also worth noting that some 150 
taxonomic approaches, like phenetics and the Phylo-Phenetic species concept, even explicitly 151 
adopt criteria of sufficient similarity for the legitimacy of species individuation. However, like 152 
many have pointed out in objections to these phenetic approaches to classification (e.g. Hull, 153 
1997, p. 360), a criterion of sufficient similarity ultimately fails to fend off radical pluralism. 154 
First, given the enormous number of similarity-relations in the organic world, radical pluralism 155 
would most likely still obtain on the simple similarity view even with a threshold of sufficient 156 
similarity. To see this, consider that within any species, some organisms will share more 157 
properties than others, and different organisms may share slightly different sets of properties. 158 
According to the simple similarity view, these different sets of similarities should all be 159 
recognised as different, legitimate categories. Second, the criterion of sufficient similarity is 160 
set by the researchers, and not by the world. Hence, if we assume that the legitimacy of 161 
classification is determined only by the world, it follows that the criterion of sufficient 162 
similarity is arbitrary. This means that there is no qualitative difference between groups that 163 
just meet the criterion of sufficient similarity and groups that just fall short of meeting it. This, 164 
in turn, means that the simple similarity view slides off into more radical forms of pluralism as 165 
the required degree of similarity is lowered.  166 
Given that essentialism does not apply to species classification, and the simple similarity view 167 
fails to fend off radical pluralism, it is perhaps not surprising that the third and final view on 168 
the relation between the world and classification, which I will call the causal view, is the most 169 
popular with respect to species. This view holds that the legitimacy of classification lies in its 170 
tracking the causal structure of the world (Boyd, 1999, 2000; Khalidi, 2013). This view also 171 
regards legitimate categories as stable clusters of properties, but adds to this the requirement 172 
that this stability must be explained by a set of causal processes or mechanisms that lie at the 173 
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basis of this clustering. For example, similarity between the organisms of a species is the result 174 
of causal processes such as interbreeding, shared selection pressures, shared developmental 175 
mechanisms, inherited niches, and so on. Species classification, then, is considered legitimate 176 
if it picks out groups of organisms that are similar due to a shared causal basis. This causal 177 
view fits very well with taxonomic practice, where species are commonly individuated on the 178 
basis of similarity due to genealogical causal history and evolutionary causes of intraspecific 179 
cohesion (Baum, 2009; De Queiroz, 2005).  180 
One might think that the causal view is more likely to fend off radical pluralism than the simple 181 
similarity view. As the causal view denies that all that is required for legitimacy is simply some 182 
similarity relation, it only recognises a subset of the categories recognised by the simple 183 
similarity view. More precisely, it only recognises those property-clusters with an appropriate 184 
causal basis. Given that such causal bases often explain many similarity relations at once, 185 
adopting them as the basis for classification should thus lead to fewer classificatory schemes 186 
than when we start from the similarity relations themselves. 187 
However, while the requirement of a causal basis is likely to decrease the absolute number of 188 
legitimate classifications, it is not clear whether it can fend off radical pluralism. Various 189 
authors have raised what may be called an argument from causal complexity to claim that the 190 
causal view on classification leads to radical pluralism too (Barker & Velasco, 2013; Dupré, 191 
1993; Stegenga, 2016). This argument has two premises. First, it holds that some parts of the 192 
world are causally very complex, i.e. phenomena in these domains are affected by 193 
innumerable fine-grained causes or mechanisms. Second, it holds that no classification can 194 
track the complete causal structure of those parts of the world, so a classification is legitimate 195 
if it tracks at least part of this causal structure. This second premise follows directly from the 196 
pluralist position, which denies that there is a single best classification but still holds that there 197 
are multiple legitimate classifications. Assuming then that a classification is legitimate if it 198 
tracks at least part of the causal structure of the world, it follows that there are innumerable 199 
legitimate classifications of those parts of the world that are causally complex. 200 
This argument has been proposed by various authors in different contexts. Discussing Boyd’s 201 
(1999) causal view on the legitimacy of classifications, Craver (2009) argues that there are 202 
innumerable different ways of individuating the causal basis of legitimate categories, and, 203 
hence, of individuating the legitimate categories themselves. Stegenga (2016) makes a similar 204 
argument about populations. Interpreting populations as groups of organisms unified by fine-205 
grained causal relations between the organisms, he argues that there are always so many of 206 
these that innumerable legitimate classifications can be constructed on the basis of them. 207 
Finally, Barker and Velasco (2013) make a similar argument about evolutionary groups in 208 
general. They argue that regardless of the processes or patterns that one takes as the causal 209 
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basis of such groups, these can always be specified in countless different fine-grained ways, 210 
leading to countless equally legitimate classifications. 211 
Let me apply this argument to the case of species with a brief example borrowed from Barker 212 
and Velasco (2013, pp. 975-976). Suppose we define species, as many taxonomists do, on the 213 
basis of evolutionary cohesion between the members of the species. Among the main causes 214 
of evolutionary cohesion is the fact that organisms within a species are subject to the same 215 
selection pressures. However, organisms are subject to a great number of selection pressures. 216 
And while there may be considerable overlap between the groups of organisms affected by 217 
each of these selection pressures, it is also beyond doubt that they rarely pick out precisely 218 
the same groups, and often pick out very different groups. Moreover, selection pressures vary 219 
over time and space, and thus affect different organisms to a different degree. Organisms also 220 
differ in the way they respond to these selection pressures. Thus, many different 221 
classifications are possible depending on which of many selection pressures we focus on, and 222 
the degree of intensity of these pressures we deem relevant. One organism might be part of 223 
a group that responds similarly to increased aridity, while it is part of another group that 224 
responds similarly to the amount of sunlight. The number of kinds rapidly increases when we 225 
take more causal factors and combinations of causal factors into account, such as other 226 
selection pressures and interactions like interbreeding.1  227 
The argument from causal complexity implies that there are countless classifications that track 228 
parts of the causal structure of the organic world, and hence are legitimate if this structure is 229 
the only relevant criterion. Given the complexity of the organic world and the high number of 230 
causes at work in forming species-level groups, it is clear that this leads to a radical form of 231 
species pluralism. Earlier in this section, I already argued that essentialism does not apply to 232 
species and that the other viable view on the way the world constrains species classification, 233 
namely the simple similarity view, also leads to radical pluralism. It follows that any view on 234 
the legitimacy of species classification that considers this legitimacy to be only dependent on 235 
the world is subject to radical pluralism and its descriptive and normative problems. 236 
3. Classificatory norms to the rescue 237 
The previous section argued that if we take the world as the only factor determining the 238 
legitimacy of species classifications, then radical pluralism inevitably follows. Slater points out 239 
                                                          
1 It is worth noting that the differences between these kinds are not merely a matter of boundary-drawing. While there may 
be many kinds that have very similar extensions (e.g. kinds based on various intensities of one selection pressure), the 
diversity of causal factors and possible combinations of causal factors implies that many of these kinds have substantially 
different extensions too. 
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that while this argument may hold, there is an easy response here for the moderate pluralist. 240 
He writes that 241 
[t]he moderate pluralist contends not merely that different classification systems are 242 
possible – this is obviously true – but that among those different possibilities, a number 243 
of them are legitimate by the lights of shared higher-level aims. Classificatory choice 244 
operates within a limited space of legitimate possibilities. The question of moderation 245 
or radicalness of classificatory pluralism for a given domain turns on the size of this 246 
space – the degree to which the world and our norms constrain our classificatory 247 
activities – at any level we care to countenance. (Slater, 2017, p. 9) 248 
In other words, Slater accepts that there are innumerable ontologically valid classifications, 249 
but argues that only a few of these are suitable given the purposes we have for constructing 250 
these classifications in the first place. The claim then is that radical pluralism turns into 251 
moderate pluralism when we take into account the requirements of the aims of classification. 252 
For example, one could say that species classifications should in the first place be useful for 253 
biological research. This way, moderate pluralists can rule out categories such as the cook’s 254 
kale, cauliflower and cabbage. While these categories track real features of the world and are 255 
useful for the cook’s purposes, they go against the scientific aims of taxonomy by splitting up 256 
Brassica oleracea into several non-historical groups. 257 
The idea that the aims of a classification determine its legitimacy and thus fend off radical 258 
pluralism is a common one among pluralists. Kitcher (1984, p. 309), for example, writes that 259 
the legitimacy of species classification is determined by what is biologically interesting, and 260 
retains nine distinct classificatory schemes. Similarly, Dupré argues that the legitimacy of 261 
classifications depends on them being useful for ‘some significant purpose’ (1993, p. 51), and 262 
that ‘relative to a sufficiently well-articulated set of aims of enquiry there may very well be, 263 
and often is, a best way of classifying the phenomena within a domain’ (2002, p. 31). In line 264 
with this, Boyd (1999, p. 148) connects the legitimacy of natural classification to the ‘inductive 265 
and explanatory aims’ of a discipline. Ereshefsky (2001, chapter 5), finally, argues that 266 
generally accepted classificatory norms bridge the gap between a radical ‘anything goes’ 267 
pluralism and a moderate pluralist view.  268 
Of course, the aims that determine the legitimacy of species classification cannot just be any 269 
set of preferences. As there are innumerable conceivable goals, this would bring us back to 270 
radical pluralism. In other words, the moderate pluralist requires an account of what norms 271 
should guide taxonomy. While such an account is beyond the scope of this paper, we can 272 
derive at least three properties these norms must have in order to play the constraining role 273 
required for moderate pluralism. 274 
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First, the classificatory norms that constrain species classification must be shared across the 275 
discipline of taxonomy, and this discipline must range over all work on species classification. 276 
If taxonomic research takes place in multiple disciplines, pluralism obtains because different 277 
scientific disciplines have different aims that in turn favour different classifications. Not 278 
surprisingly, those who rely on classificatory norms to avoid radical species pluralism all 279 
assume such a broad discipline and shared goals. Ereshefsky (2001) refers to biological 280 
taxonomy as the relevant discipline and to a single shared aim as restricting the legitimacy of 281 
species classifications. Similarly, Kitcher (1984, p. 309), Boyd (1999, p. 148) and Slater (2017) 282 
refer to the goals of biology, evolutionary biology and functional biology when discussing the 283 
constraining role of classificatory norms.2 284 
Second, to significantly reduce the number of legitimate classifications in a domain, the shared 285 
goals must be limited in number and hierarchically ordered. Again, this is because different 286 
classifications are legitimate depending on the goals that are adopted. If taxonomy has many 287 
competing goals, and different taxonomists pursue different aims or balance them in different 288 
ways, then the number of legitimate classifications increases. Radical pluralism of aims results 289 
in radical pluralism of legitimate classifications. This requirement fits well with Ereshefsky’s 290 
(2001) claim that the single overriding goal of taxonomy is to allow biologists to make 291 
inferences about the organic world. 292 
One may object here that a multitude of goals need not necessarily lead to a multitude of 293 
different legitimate classifications: it may well be that different aims lead to the same 294 
classification, thus avoiding radical pluralism. However, the argument from causal complexity 295 
discussed in section 2 suggests that such convergence of classifications is unlikely. According 296 
to that argument, there are innumerable different classifications that all track some aspect of 297 
the causal structure of the organic world. Some of these are as different as focusing on entirely 298 
different causal processes (e.g. interbreeding and selection pressures), while others are only 299 
slightly different in that they focus on fine-grained differences between different instances of 300 
similar causal processes (e.g. different intensity-ranges of the same selection pressure). The 301 
point here is that given this enormous number of ontologically valid classifications, it is unlikely 302 
that any two aims are optimally served by precisely the same classification. It follows that a 303 
multitude of goals is likely to lead to an equal multitude of legitimate classifications. 304 
                                                          
2 Elsewhere, Boyd (1999, p. 148) explicitly points out that disciplines (or, as he calls them, disciplinary matrices) 
need not correspond to ‘academic or practical disciplines otherwise understood’. Instead, a disciplinary matrix is 
any ‘family of inductive and explanatory aims and practices, together with the conceptual resources and 
vocabulary within which they are implemented’ (Boyd, 2000, p. 57). This is compatible both with interpreting 
these matrices as relatively broad scientific disciplines (e.g. evolutionary biology), and with interpreting them as 
research projects. Boyd’s (e.g. 1999, p. 168) references to biology as the relevant disciplinary matrix for species 
classification suggests the former interpretation. 
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Finally, like the general aims themselves, the ways in which these aims are operationalized 305 
must be generally accepted and limited in number. Let me explain. In order to cover the whole 306 
diversity of taxonomic research projects, the overriding goals of the discipline must be rather 307 
general. Such general goals are too vague to guide classificatory choices in a direct and precise 308 
way. Instead, they have to be operationalised through low-level norms that spell out the best 309 
way to attain the general goals.3 For example, Slater (2017, p. 7) argues that a norm favouring 310 
intrinsic over extrinsic properties as a basis for classification may be seen as a lower-level 311 
operationalization of a more general norm favouring the stability of classifications, which in 312 
turn may be an operationalization of a more general aim like Ereshefsky’s ‘facilitating 313 
inferences’.4 It is best then to think of classificatory norms in terms of a hierarchical set of 314 
nested norms, where the higher-level norms justify lower-level norms, and the overall goals 315 
ultimately justify all other norms. In that sense, the overriding aims of a discipline are 316 
considered intrinsically valuable within that discipline, while the lower-level norms are only 317 
instrumentally valuable as a means of fulfilling the overriding aims. The point here is that 318 
classificatory norms can only fend off radical pluralism if the ways in which the general goals 319 
are operationalized through lower-level norms are limited in number and universally accepted 320 
within the discipline. This is because different operationalizations of aims lead to different 321 
classifications, and consequently to pluralism 322 
Let us take stock of the arguments so far. I have presented the no criterion objection to 323 
moderate species pluralism, and considered classificatory norms as a response to this 324 
objection. I then argued that this response is only successful if these norms meet three 325 
conditions: (1) the aims of species classification must be shared across the broadly conceived 326 
discipline of taxonomy; (2) the aims of taxonomy must be low in number and hierarchically 327 
ordered; and (3), the overriding aims must be operationalized in a low number of ways, and 328 
these operationalizations must be generally accepted. If these conditions are met, it seems 329 
that Hull’s ‘reasonable middle ground’ of moderate pluralism may be possible after all. 330 
One could object here that it is trivially true that there are innumerable possible goals that 331 
taxonomists could pursue, which in turn could be operationalized in many different ways. 332 
Without a further meta-norm to arbitrate between these norms and operationalizations, the 333 
conditions above are not met and we are led back to the radical pluralism we are trying to 334 
avoid. And it is not clear where such a meta-norm could be found, as there are again 335 
innumerable possible meta-norms to choose from, and so on ad infinitum. However, the 336 
                                                          
3 Ereshefsky (2001) calls these low-level norms ‘methodological rules’, Slater (2017) calls them ‘ground-level norms’.  
4 This is also in line with much recent work in the philosophy of science that emphasizes the importance of the ways general 
goals and norms are operationalized in scientific practice (see Fagan, 2017 and Kendig and Eckdahl, 2017 for examples with 
detailed case studies). 
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obvious fact that there are many possible norms does not show that the actual goals of 337 
taxonomy do not constrain the legitimacy of classification (Slater, 2017, p. 9). Thus, the 338 
question is whether in fact all taxonomic research is part of a single discipline that shares a 339 
few general aims that limit the number of legitimate classifications. I turn to this question in 340 
the next section. 341 
4. The multiple aims of taxonomy 342 
Ereshefsky (2001,183) investigates important texts by leading taxonomists, and concludes 343 
that there is surprising agreement in taxonomy about the ‘single overall aim’ that guides 344 
species classification. Together with a limited set of low-level norms, Ereshefsky argues, these 345 
aims lead to a tempered pluralism. Arguing against Ereshefsky’s conclusion, this section shows 346 
that none of the three requirements for classificatory norms to constrain radical pluralism are 347 
met. It follows that shared classificatory norms in taxonomy do not fend off radical species 348 
pluralism. 349 
4.1. Species classification in many disciplines 350 
To avoid radical pluralism, the classificatory norms that constrain species classification must 351 
be shared across the relevant scientific discipline, namely, taxonomy. In addition, it is also 352 
important that this discipline covers all research on species classification, as the different aims 353 
of different disciplines would lead to pluralism. This poses a problem for the moderate species 354 
pluralist, as the extension of taxonomy is not at all clear. Taxonomy is sometimes defined as 355 
the scientific discipline involved with assigning names to groups of organisms, identifying 356 
groups of organisms and ordering these groups in a system of classification, or with 357 
discovering, identifying and naming species and reconstructing their history. More 358 
importantly, taxonomic research is also closely entangled with other scientific disciplines. 359 
Gotelli (2004) uses his research on North American ants to illustrate the impact of taxonomy 360 
on ecological research. He emphasizes the importance of usable taxonomic keys, current 361 
nomenclature not hindered by synonymy, species occurrence records, and phylogenies. 362 
Similarly, Isaac et al. (2004) argue that a reliable and stable taxonomy is crucial for ecology, 363 
where species figure as the units of many of the patterns under investigation. Others (e.g. 364 
Braby & Williams, 2016; Frankham et al., 2012; Khuroo et al., 2007) emphasise the importance 365 
of taxonomy for conservation biology, which requires a reliable inventory of life. 366 
The connection between taxonomy and other disciplines of evolutionary biology is further 367 
illustrated by the fact that a large share of recent taxonomic work is published as part of 368 
papers exploring hypotheses from these disciplines. Indeed, this is increasingly seen as a 369 
necessary aspect of taxonomic research. Halme et al. (2015, p. 1834) write that  370 
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[b]uilding one´s resume´ strategically is becoming more and more of a standard among 371 
academics and publishing solely descriptive taxonomy has become a difficult pathway 372 
to scientific positions. Many skilful taxonomists already work in close collaboration 373 
with systematists and evolutionary biologists or they are working on evolutionary 374 
hypotheses themselves, which allows publishing in higher-impact journals and 375 
improving citation rates. 376 
The point here is that the close relation between taxonomy and other disciplines suggests that 377 
the goals of taxonomy are not entirely distinct from the goals of these disciplines. Often 378 
taxonomic research is part of broader research projects, or taxonomists are motivated by the 379 
needs of other disciplines. This suggests that there are many ways of individuating the 380 
discipline that any particular taxonomic research is part of. If we assume that different 381 
disciplines come with different aims, species pluralism follows from the different ways in 382 
which taxonomy is individuated and the different disciplines in which taxonomists operate. 383 
4.2. A plurality of aims 384 
Ereshefsky (2001, 175) assumes that taxonomic research broadly falls within one discipline, 385 
and argues that this discipline is unified by the aim of providing ‘empirically accurate 386 
classifications that allow biologists to make inferences’. This subsection argues that while 387 
inferential strength is undoubtedly an important aim of taxonomy, it does not exhaust these 388 
aims or override all others.   389 
One central aim of taxonomy is to store information in an efficient way and provide a clear 390 
naming system. Taxonomists Nelson and Platnick (1981, p. 9), for example, write that 391 
‘classifications obviously perform an essential function in information storage and retrieval. 392 
They allow us to deal with tremendous amounts of data by subsuming a great deal of 393 
information into single words’. Another important aim of taxonomy lies in providing measures 394 
for biodiversity through proxies such as species richness and species density. As Carvalho et 395 
al. (2014, 323) point out, this goal often does not coincide with that of supporting inferences, 396 
as optimizing the latter requires extensive study of phylogeny, biogeography and evolutionary 397 
processes while optimizing the former is probably best served by using our resources to 398 
describe more taxa in a faster and more superficial way. Yet another aim of taxonomy, finally, 399 
is to facilitate modelling. Mota-Vargas and Rojas-Soto (2016), for example, emphasise that the 400 
outcomes of Ecological Niche Models are directly dependent on the choice of criteria for 401 
species delimitation, and argue that these criteria should be chosen in function of what the 402 
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model in question is testing. In such cases, species delimitation serves the particular goals of 403 
that model rather than general inferential strength.5 404 
The aims of taxonomy discussed in the previous paragraph are all epistemic rather than non-405 
epistemic, as they concern advancing biological knowledge rather than the use of 406 
classifications outside of science. There is, however, no reason to think that the goals of 407 
taxonomy are purely epistemic. Various authors have recently argued that non-epistemic 408 
goals are no less important than epistemic goals in guiding science (Elliott & McKaughan, 2014; 409 
Potochnik, 2015, 2017). Species classification does not seem to be an exception here, as 410 
taxonomic research is commonly driven by non-epistemic concerns.  411 
Most importantly, taxonomists frequently emphasize facilitating biodiversity conservation as 412 
an important goal. For example, Frankham et al. (2012) argue that the choice of species 413 
concepts in taxonomy should be geared towards the conservation aims of taxonomy. They 414 
point out that human impact on the environment has caused the habitats of many species to 415 
be split into unconnected fragments, effectively splitting these groups into multiple small 416 
groups. Because these fragmented groups would interbreed if their habitats were still 417 
connected, they are likely to be recognised as a single species under the Biological Species 418 
Concept (BSC). At the same time, these small groups are likely to be recognised as separate 419 
species under the diagnosability-based Phylogenetic Species Concept (PSC), because they 420 
quickly become diagnosable due to drift. In such cases, Frankham et al. argue, taxonomists 421 
should adopt the BSC, as this would promote conservation action aimed at re-establishing 422 
gene-flow between the fragmented populations. Using the PSC, they argue, makes such policy 423 
unlikely and in this way puts these groups at risk of inbreeding depression and potentially 424 
extinction. A similar example comes from Wege et al. (2015), who argue that taxonomists in 425 
Western-Australia should prioritize groups of conservation concern, particularly those that are 426 
susceptible to mining activities in that area, to allow effective conservation action before 427 
those groups go extinct. In both these examples, it is clear that conservation aims are 428 
intrinsically valued and substantially impact species classification.   429 
Biodiversity conservation is not the only practical goal that guides taxonomists. The recent 430 
plenary meeting of the Linnean Society of London titled ‘Who Needs Taxonomists?’ (see 431 
Linnean Society, 2014) provides a wide range of examples of taxonomic research directly 432 
aimed at practical applications. These include topics as diverse as sea lice important for the 433 
salmon farming industry, the trade in sandalwood essential oils and star anise, mining projects 434 
in Guinea and the impact of climate change on the distribution of coffee species. One 435 
                                                          
5 MacLeod (2013) points out that philosophical accounts of scientific classification have focused too much on 
inferential strength at the expense of other purposes of classification such as facilitating modelling, 
experimentation, understanding, and explanation. Ereshefsky’s claim about taxonomy fits well in this pattern. 
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particularly interesting example comes from Attenborough (2015), who argues that effective 436 
prevention and combat of malaria require species classification that is as specific and detailed 437 
as possible, effectively consisting of PSC species rather than BSC species. More precisely, 438 
Attenborough points out that there are many morphologically cryptic groups with fixed 439 
genetic differences. While these groups cannot be readily distinguished except by molecular 440 
data, the variables affecting malaria transmission often differ between these groups. Thus, 441 
combatting the transmission of malaria requires distinguishing between these groups. He 442 
argues that species classifications that overlook these differences risk leading to interventions 443 
that likewise overlook these differences. He writes that using the PSC is important ‘to improve 444 
human health in the tropical Western Pacific, sub-Saharan Africa and other places still greatly 445 
afflicted by this scourge’ (Attenborough, 2015, p. 147). 446 
The importance of these practical goals is further reflected in the guidelines of important 447 
funding sources for taxonomy such as the ‘Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research 448 
Council’ and ‘Natural Environment Research Council’, which explicitly require taxonomic 449 
research to have direct practical applications, and mention food security, industrial 450 
biotechnology, health research, and more generally, wealth creation (see Linnean Society, 451 
2014). Kim and Byrne (2006, p. 799) express this source of goals for taxonomy powerfully 452 
when they write that ‘[t]axonomy should be reinvigorated and reinvented through 453 
collaborative, interdisciplinary research that brings taxonomic insights to bear on topics 454 
important to twenty-first century society (e.g., food security, invasive species, and ecosystem 455 
services).’ They argue that the mere description of biodiversity and the construction of an 456 
inferentially strong system form an overly narrow view on the goals of taxonomy. Instead, 457 
taxonomic research should accommodate ‘environmental and societal issues’ (p799).  458 
The discussion in the previous paragraphs suggests that taxonomy has many intrinsically 459 
valued non-epistemic and epistemic goals. This has direct implications for the ability of 460 
classificatory norms to keep radical species pluralism at bay. These norms only limit the space 461 
of legitimate classifications to a moderate number if there are only a few, generally accepted 462 
goals. If there are many different goals, and if different taxonomists work with different goals 463 
in mind, radical pluralism re-enters through these multiple goals.  464 
To resist this conclusion and avert radical pluralism, moderate pluralists could at this point 465 
argue that the plurality of goals guiding taxonomy are hierarchically ordered. The point is that 466 
if some goals consistently trump all other goals, moderate pluralism is compatible with a large 467 
range of goals in taxonomy (see Ereshefsky, 2001, pp. 170–171). On such a view, the main 468 
aims of the discipline largely shape species classification, while secondary aims only play a role 469 
in the limited space left by these main goals.  470 
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However, there is no reason to think that this is the case. This is clearly illustrated by debates 471 
concerning DNA-barcoding, an approach to species identification and classification that 472 
recognises groups as a species on the basis of a short mitochondrial DNA marker. Some 473 
biologists argue that DNA-barcoding should not be used for species classification because it 474 
does not take into account morphological, phylogenetic or ecological data, and thus provides 475 
knowledge that is more superficial than traditional taxonomy. Others argue that given the 476 
pressing conservation concerns, we should adopt DNA-barcoding because it is faster and 477 
cheaper than traditional approaches, and requires far less specialist knowledge (see Costello 478 
et al., 2013; Joppa et al., 2011). Such a fast, easy-to-use and standardized taxonomic 479 
procedure is attractive to many users of taxonomy because it would speed up the construction 480 
of a complete and user-friendly inventory of life. Thus, this is a clash between the broadly 481 
epistemic goals of taxonomy and its practical goals.  482 
This explicit debate among biologists shows that there is no universally accepted goal that 483 
consistently trumps other goals. Instead, there is genuine disagreement, and multiple goals 484 
play a role. These undoubtedly include broad epistemic goals like maximizing inferential 485 
strength, but also more specific epistemic and non-epistemic aims like avoiding inbreeding 486 
depression in fragmented populations or prioritizing the conservation of threatened endemic 487 
species. Depending on which of these aims are pursued and how they are balanced, different 488 
legitimate classifications will result. 489 
4.3. A plurality of low-level norms 490 
One may object that the diversity of aims ascribed to taxonomy above can easily be rephrased 491 
in terms of a few very general goals, such as ‘support inferences and explanations’ and 492 
‘simplicity’ or even ‘usefulness’. This is consistent with the taxonomic literature, as 493 
taxonomists often explicitly state the goals of their discipline in such general terms (see 494 
Ereshefsky, 2001). However, regardless of whether this accurately describes the goals of 495 
taxonomy, this move fails to reduce pluralism. In order to see this, it is helpful to turn to the 496 
third condition for classificatory norms to constrain pluralism, namely, a limited and shared 497 
set of low-level norms that operationalise the general aims. If there are many different sets of 498 
low-level norms that are equally suitable to attain the high-level goals of a discipline, pluralism 499 
still obtains even if there is general agreement about the overriding aims. Phrasing the high-500 
level goals of taxonomy in very general, vague terms makes it likely that this is the case. That 501 
is, goals like ‘support inferences’ or ‘allow for practically useful classifications’ can be 502 
interpreted and operationalised in innumerable ways. Depending on how we do this, different 503 
low-level norms and different classifications result, resulting in radical pluralism.  504 
16 
 
This is confirmed by the enormous methodological diversity in the field of species delimitation 505 
(Camargo & Sites, 2013; Sites & Marshall, 2004). Even among taxonomists who subscribe to 506 
the same conception of species, and thus arguably also to similar goals of taxonomy, there is 507 
a dazzling variety of methods being used for species delimitation. For example, the currently 508 
popular Multi-Species Coalescent-Based Methods are more repeatable and universally 509 
applicable than traditional morphology-based methods, as they rely on the same 510 
(homologous) neutral loci in different taxa and the statistical methods yield the same results 511 
independently from who runs them. Traditional morphology-based methods, on the other 512 
hand, are more prone to bias because they require expert judgment but are not dependent 513 
on the limitations and accuracy of the assumptions of the models (Camargo & Sites, 2013). 514 
Thus, different methods accomplish different low-level aims. This is important, as these 515 
different methods often lead to different outcomes for the same groups of organisms. Satler 516 
et al. (2013), for example, apply seven commonly used model-based methods to the same 517 
group of trapdoor spiders, which variously yield between three and eighteen different species.  518 
Thus, even if we assume that these approaches to species delimitation are all different 519 
operationalisations of the same high-level goals, it is undeniable that they do this by means of 520 
different low-level aims that ultimately lead to different results. Given the high number of 521 
methods of species delimitation, this yields pluralism of the radical kind.  522 
4.4. Classificatory norms do not fend off radical pluralism 523 
The arguments in the previous subsections show that shared classificatory aims and norms 524 
are not sufficient to fend off radical pluralism. Even if such shared norms exist in taxonomy, 525 
they are supplemented by further aims and decisions about how to operationalize and balance 526 
these aims. Depending on which of innumerable possible further aims, balancing schemes and 527 
operationalizations we select, different classifications will result. It follows that if we take 528 
generally shared norms along with the world as the only factors relevant for the legitimacy of 529 
species classification, radical pluralism cannot be avoided. 530 
One might object here that this pluralism is of the moderate rather than the radical sort; even 531 
if each research project adopts slightly different aims and operationalizations, it does not 532 
follow that there are innumerable legitimate classifications.6 However, while the pluralism 533 
that results from relying on classificatory norms is clearly less radical than the pluralism 534 
discussed in section 2, it is still too promiscuous to qualify as moderate. To see why, it is worth 535 
remembering that moderate and radical pluralism are distinguished on the basis of the 536 
descriptive and normative problems associated with radical pluralism. Even if classificatory 537 
norms strongly reduce radical pluralism, the resulting pluralism still seems to suffer from these 538 
                                                          
6 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this objection. 
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problems. More precisely, having a distinct classificatory scheme for each research project 539 
makes it hard to arbitrate between multiple competing scientific classifications (the normative 540 
problem); in addition, the resulting number of classifications remains far removed from the 541 
moderate pluralism or even monism we observe in current taxonomic practice (the descriptive 542 
problem).  543 
5. Local decisions determine the legitimacy of classification 544 
The previous sections have argued that radical species pluralism threatens for any view that 545 
makes the legitimacy of classification only dependent on the world and shared classificatory 546 
norms. Fortunately, the arguments in this paper also suggest what is missing from such views: 547 
local decisions. Local aims of research and decisions concerning the operationalization and 548 
balancing of these aims also shape the outcomes of species classification. It follows that any 549 
philosophical view that aims to make sense of the legitimacy of such classifications should 550 
include these local decisions, as well as general norms and the world. 551 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to propose such an account in any detail. It is clear 552 
however, that it would differ substantially from currently available views on scientific 553 
classification that ground the legitimacy of classification solely in the world and classificatory 554 
norms shared across a ‘domain’ (Slater, 2017, p. 9) or ‘disciplinary matrix’ (Boyd, 1999, p. 165). 555 
As these views assume that the relevant aims and low-level norms are shared across broad 556 
fields of science, they fail to capture the impact of local aims and local decisions concerning 557 
operationalizations. While Slater’s, Boyd’s, and also Ereshefsky’s (2001) views may be 558 
compatible with a role for local decisions, they do not discuss it explicitly and thus leave a 559 
crucial aspect of the legitimacy of classification unexplored.  560 
Two such unexplored aspects that a view on the legitimacy of classification should incorporate 561 
are particularly noteworthy. First, the role of local decisions implies that classifications are 562 
highly path-dependent and contingent on the particular research projects and contexts in 563 
which they are developed. This means that a classification can be legitimate even if it could 564 
very well have turned out differently had other, equally valid local decisions been made about 565 
the aims of research and the operationalization of these aims. What matters for legitimacy in 566 
such cases is what decisions were in fact made in classificatory practice. Thus, the fact that a 567 
category is recognised and plays a role in successful classificatory practices is an important 568 
part of its legitimacy.  569 
Second, my arguments imply that there may often be competing classifications that meet the 570 
relevant constraints of the world and generally accepted norms. A suitable philosophical view 571 
on the legitimacy of classification should provide an account of how clashes between such 572 
classifications are or can be resolved. The need for such an account is illustrated by such 573 
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clashes in classificatory practice. Take, for example, the recent controversy about a 574 
phenomenon called ‘taxonomic inflation’, which is the strong increase in species numbers due 575 
the splitting of existing species into multiple smaller groups (Isaac et al., 2004). Despite an 576 
abundance of data and general agreement about the appropriate species concept, there has 577 
been no progress in the debate between those who claim that such splitting is desirable and 578 
those who claim it is not. This stalemate as well as the frequent use of normative terms such 579 
as ‘inflation’ suggests that the disagreement at hand is one between different sets of aims and 580 
low-level norms. To account for such debates and the ways they can be resolved, it is 581 
important that philosophical views on the legitimacy of classification dedicate appropriate 582 
attention to the role of local aims and local decisions concerning operationalization. 583 
While the arguments presented for it in this paper are new, a similar view on the legitimacy 584 
of classification has been proposed by others. Discussing the legitimacy of scientific 585 
classification in general (rather than focusing on species), Thomas Reydon (2015, p. 70) argues 586 
that ‘a crucial part of classificatory practices consists in local decisions of investigators in 587 
particular contexts of research […]’. According to Reydon, the result of these local decisions is 588 
that scientific categories are fundamentally shaped by their investigative context, i.e.  the aims 589 
of research as well as practices and institutions. Reydon (2015, p. 67) explicitly emphasizes 590 
that this context is typically not shared by all members of a discipline and varies between 591 
different research projects. Reydon calls this view on scientific classification the ‘co-creation 592 
model’, as it makes scientific kinds the joint creation of the world and the investigative context 593 
in which the kinds are developed. 594 
Like the view defended here, Reydon connects the legitimacy of classification directly to the 595 
local decisions of researchers embedded in a particular research context with a particular set 596 
of aims. Moreover, his view also implements the two aspects discussed above. First, Reydon 597 
emphasises how scientific classification is path-dependent. Not only are kinds dependent on 598 
the aims and practices of particular context in which they are developed, they also impact 599 
further classificatory research. Second, Reydon also points out that scientific classifications in 600 
the same domain often vary depending on the particular context of investigation for which 601 
they were constructed. While he does not explicitly connect this to debates between 602 
proponents of different classifications, it is easy to see how his view could account for such 603 
debates. 604 
6. Conclusion 605 
This paper has discussed the no criterion argument for radical species pluralism and argued 606 
that because taxonomy has many goals and ways of operationalizing these goals, this radical 607 
pluralism cannot be avoided solely by relying on classificatory norms. This implies that in 608 
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addition to relying on the world and classificatory norms, taxonomists involved in species 609 
delimitation also rely on local decisions concerning these aims and norms. This means that 610 
any philosophical view on the legitimacy of these classifications must be able to account for 611 
these local decisions. 612 
It is worth considering the extent to which the arguments in this paper can be extended 613 
beyond the case of species classification. As the arguments about the goals of taxonomy in 614 
section 4 are empirical rather than philosophical, the conclusions of this paper do not 615 
straightforwardly apply to domains outside taxonomy. I believe, however, that given the close 616 
entanglement of many scientific disciplines and their practical applications (see Douglas, 617 
2014), similar arguments could be constructed for many of the fields to which the argument 618 
from causal complexity applies. If this is true, then the conclusions concerning philosophical 619 
views on the legitimacy of classification have more general bearing too. However, providing 620 
detailed arguments for this is beyond the scope of this paper. 621 
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